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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991) 1, 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1991) 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900382-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
LEMUEL T. SMALL, * 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute (methamphetamine), 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1991); possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute (marijuana), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1991); and 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1991). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling 
that the roadblock stop of defendant's vehicle was proper and 
that defendant consented to the subsequent search of the vehicle. 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's ruling on a 
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless they 
are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the trial court's 
legal conclusions based on its factual findings, the appellate 
court applies a correction of error standard of review. State v. 
Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 610 (Utah App. 1991). Accord United States 
v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lemuel Thomas Small, was charged in an 
amended information with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991), and two counts of 
possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute 
(methamphetamine and marijuana), as second and third degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ivj 
(Supp. 1991) (Record [R.] 150-51). 
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence seized incident to the roadblock stop of 
defendant's vehicle,1 a jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 
28; defendant's motion to suppress; R. 55-58, trial court's 
ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress; R. 200-02, guilty 
verdict). The court sentenced defendant to a term of not less 
1
 Although defendant was tried jointly with a codefendant, 
Dennis Shoulderblade, defendants elected to take separate 
appeals. See State v. Shoulderblade, No. 900288-CA. 
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than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for 
the second degree felony, and two terms not to exceed five years 
in the Utah State Prison for the two third degree felonies, all 
terms to run concurrently (R. 302). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the 
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling, 
which defendant does not challenge (R. 55-58). Those findings of 
fact are as follows: 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway 
Patrol, in conjunction with the Millard 
County Sheriff's Office conducted a roadblock 
on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15, 
south of Fillmore. Notice of the checkpoint 
was duly given one week before in the local 
newspaper of general circulation. Prior to 
setting the roadblock, the officers were 
briefed and instructed to check for proper 
driver's license and vehicle registration. 
Appropriate signs were placed, announcing the 
checkpoint at some distance in front of the 
block. 
During the roadblock, all cars were stopped. 
Pursuant to the roadblock, defendants were 
stopped. During the stop, the officer 
present observed defendant Small shove a 
plastic bag between the front seats of the 
car. The officer checked both defendants' 
identification and determined that the car 
was not registered to either defendant. 
While awaiting confirmation from dispatch 
regarding registration, the officer asked 
defendants whether there were any firearms, 
alcohol, or drugs in the car. The response 
was in the negative. The officer then 
requested permission to search the vehicle. 
Consent was given. 
As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, 
the officer noticed a gun under the front 
seat. [The] [subsequent search of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle revealed 
-3-
a substantial quantity of drugs, drug 
paraphernalia, money, and loaded firearms. 
In the course of the search of the passenger 
compartment, the officer asked defendants if 
they knew anytning about the firearms or the 
drugs. Defendants responded in the negative, 
They were subsequently arrested and were 
apprised of their rights before any further 
attempt at questioning. 
As the officer searched the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle, he smelled what 
he believed to be raw marijuana. Ke 
subsequentlyf] opened the trunk and found 
more drugs and paraphernalia. 
(R. at 55-56) (See Addendum A for a complete copy of the lower 
court's ruling).2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State concedes that the Millard County roadblock, 
established to check licenses and registration, as well as to 
observe any other violations of the criminal law, fails to meet 
the requirements for suspicionless roadblock stops under the 
federal constitution. The record before this Court fails to show 
that the roadblock was carried our pursuant to an explicit 
neutral plan, developed by politically accountable officials, 
which limited the conduct of individual officers. Moreover, 
there is no indication in the record that the authorization 
process involved any balancing of fourth amendment interests, law 
enforcement interests, or an assessment of the effectiveness of 
2
 Defendant's recitation of the facts on appeal appears 
to contain cites to the transcript of a preliminary hearing 
apparently held on October 11, 1988 which has not been made part 
of the record before this Court. 
-4-
the roadblock in meeting those interests. Therefore, the 
roadblock stop violated defendant's fourth amendment rights 
against unreasonable seizure. 
In spite of the initial illegality of the roadblock 
stop of defendant's vehicle, the issue remains whether the 
subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was nevertheless a 
valid consent search. Because the trial court ruled on the 
validity of defendant's consent to search prior to the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Arroyo 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990), this Court should remand the case to the trial court for 
evaluation of defendant's consent under Arroyo and the entry of 
appropriate factual findings and legal conclusions on the 
voluntariness and exploitation prongs of Arroyo's two-prong test. 
In remanding to the trial court, the Court first should 
clarify what standard of proof applies to the determination of 
whether there was voluntary consent to search. The majority, and 
better reasoned view, is that the state need only prove voluntary 
consent by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, the Court 
should direct the trial court to apply the exploitation prong of 
the Arroyo test in a manner different from that employed by the 
panels in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), cert. 
pending, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah May 14, 1991), and State v. 
Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, P.2d (Utah 
1991). The approach followed in Sims and Park is not consistent 
with either Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), relied on by 
-5-




THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
FAILS TO PASS FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER. 
Defendant asserts that the suspicionless roadblock at 
which he was stopped violated his federal and state 
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure 
because the roadblock, which was established to check for proper 
driver's licenses and registration, as well as to observe any 
other violations of the criminal law, was not explicitly 
authorized by statute, nor was it supported by a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, defendant asserts 
"[t]he State showed neither that the roadblock significantly 
advanced the public interest in law enforcement nor that there 
were less intrusive means available to advance that interest" 
(Br. of App. at 6). The State concedes that the roadblock in the 
present case fails to meet the requirements for suspicionless 
roadblock stops under the federal constitution. 
At the time of its denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress, the trial court ruled without benefit of the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Michigan Department of State 
Police v. Sitz, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), which 
discussed the validity of a Michigan state sobriety checkpoint 
under the fourth amendment. In addition, the trial court ruled 
without benefit of this Court's subsequent interpretative 
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opinions in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 146 (Jtah App. 1991), 
cert, pending, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah App. 1991), and State v. Park, 
810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert. denied, P.2d (Utah 1991), 
where this Court held suspicioniess roadblocks identical to the 
one at issue here invalid under the fourth amendment.3 Thus, 
the State concedes that while the trial court's factual findings 
underlying its ruling upholding the roadblock in this case are 
not clearly erroneous, its resultant legal conclusion, drawn from 
those facts, is not supportable under the aforementioned case 
law. 
As in Sims, Kitchen and Park, the record before this 
Court fails to show that the roadblock was carried out pursuant 
to an explicit neutral plan, developed by "politically 
accountable officials," which limited the conduct of individual 
officers, Park, 810 P.2d at 458; Sims, 808 P.2d at 146-47. Cf. 
Kitchen 808 P.2d at 1130 (noting that unlike the plan in Sitz, 
the roadblock plan before the court was prepared by the actual 
officer who conducted the roadblock, rather than by a neutral 
body). Moreover, there is no indication in the record "that the 
authorization process involved any balancing of fourth amendment 
interests, law enforcement interests, or an assessment of the 
3
 Sims also reached the state constitutional issue, holding 
that the roadblock there was invalid under article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution as well. 808 P.2d at 147-50. Because 
the State concedes the invalidity of the present roadblock under 
the fourth amendment, this Court need not consider its validity 
under the state constitution. Jld. at 152 (Orme, J., concurring 
specially). 
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effectiveness of the roadblock in meeting those interests." 
Park, 810 P.2d at 458; see also Sims, 808 P.2d at 146-47 (noting 
that officials authorizing a roadblock are responsible for 
performing an initial balancing between the fourth amendment and 
the interests served by the roadblock plan, which balancing is a 
prerequisite to any judicial balancing analysis of a 
suspicionless roadblock). Therefore, the roadblock stop violated 
defendant's fourth amendment rights against unreasonable seizure. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE TO THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER 
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS VALID UNDER 
STATE V. ARROYO. 
Despite the initial illegality of the roadblock stop of 
defendant's vehicle, the issue remains whether the subsequent 
warrantless search of the vehicle was nevertheless valid. 
Relying on Sims, defendant asserts that his consent to search 
"was obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of events that 
began with the roadblock stop[;] . . . . [cConsequently, the 
consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the 
initial illegal stop" (Br. of App. at 22-23).A 
A
 Defendant's non-attenuation argument is raised for the 
first time on appeal before this Court (Br. of App. at 21). 
However, a non-attenuation argument was arguably unavailable to 
defendant in the trial court because, as acknowledged in Sims, 
"then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced 
search consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary 
illegality," id. at 150; Park, 808 P.2d at 458- Thus, the State 
makes no argument concerning defendant's arguable waiver of the 
issue and acknowledges that this Court considered similar non-
attenuation arguments raised for the first time on appeal in both 
Sims and Park. 
In light of the State's concession regarding the 
illegality of the roadblock under the fourth amendment, the State 
recognizes its burden "to show that evidence obtained following 
illegal police conduct is attenuated from the illegality." Sims, 
808 P.2d at 151 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 
(1975)).5 Under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), 
the inquiry whether a consent to search is lawfully obtained 
following initial police misconduct must focus on two factors: 
(1) whether the consent was voluntary, and (2) whether the 
consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality. Because the trial court ruled on the validity of 
defendant's consent without benefit of the Arroyo analysis, this 
Court should remand the case to the trial court for an evaluation 
of defendant's consent to search under Arroyo and the entry of 
appropriate factual findings and legal conclusions on the 
voluntariness and exploitation prongs of Arroyo's two-prong test. 
However, in remanding, this Court should provide direction to the 
trial court on the proper application of Arroyo. 
A. Voluntariness 
As to the first prong of the Arroyo test, it is well 
settled that to determine whether consent to search is voluntary, 
5
 As noted previously, defendant was tried jointly with a 
codefendant, Dennis Shoulderblade; however, defendants elected to 
take separate appeals. With the exception of its discussion of 
Shoulderblade's failure to attack the trial court's finding of 
consent to search his vehicle on appeal to this Court, the 
State's analysis of the consent issue raised in this case is 
identical to its analysis of the issue in State v. Shoulderblade, 
Case No. 900288-CA. The State's brief in Shoulderblade was filed 
on November 5, 1991. 
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a totality of circumstances test applies to ascertain whether the 
consent was in fact voluntarily given and not the result of 
"duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). See also State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 
1105 (Utah 1990). And, the issue of voluntary consent is a 
question of fact on which the state carries the burden of proof. 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). But see State v. Bobo, 
803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court's ultimate 
determination of voluntary consent is a conclusion of law). 
However, this Court has not made clear what standard of proof 
applies to this factual inquiry. See State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 
460, 467 n.7 (Utah App.) (declining to decide whether the 
applicable standard of proof is the clear and convincing standard 
or the preponderance of evidence standard), cert, pending, 167 
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah July 26, 1991). There is no good reason 
not to resolve this question and provide the trial courts with 
needed direction. 
In State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887-88, and State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82, this Court appeared to adopt a clear and 
convincing standard of proof by embracing the standard espoused 
in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976). 
Quoting Abbott, the Marshall Court set out the following standard 
which must be met by the state "to sustain its burden to show 
that voluntary consent was given": 
-10-
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given"; (2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived. 
791 P.2d at 887-88 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885 (quoting 
Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962))). 
This standard has been questioned by at least one other court as 
being an unduly strict standard of proof. United States v. 
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 
U.S. 958 (1979). Indeed, insofar as the Abbott standard imposes 
a clear and convincing standard of proof on the government, it is 
contrary to the clear majority view that the government need only 
prove voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 
n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent 
to a warrantless search, the Court said the "controlling burden 
of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden 
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bouriailv v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for the 
principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. Hurtado, 
905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chaidez. 906 F.2d 
377 (8th Cir. 1990); White Fabricating Company v. United States, 
903 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 199 Ill.App.3d 
1008, 557 N.E.2d 1277 (111. App. 1990); State v. Cress, 576 A.2d 
-11-
1366 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990); 
People v. Henderson, 220 Cal.App.3d 1632f 270 Cal.Rptr. 248 
(1990) . 
While acceptance of the preponderance standard in this 
context is not universal, see 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
S 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), the United States Supreme Court has 
made clear that that standard is appropriate, thus explaining the 
majority view. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said in 
overruling its prior decisions that adopted a clear and 
convincing standard of proof: 
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has stated 
that the preponderance of evidence standard 
supplies the burden which the government must 
carry to defeat a defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence when the motion concerns 
the voluntariness of a confession, Lego v. 
Twomev, 404 U.S. 477, 482-89, 92 S.Ct. 619, 
623-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the 
voluntariness of a consent to a warrantless 
search, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the inevitable discovery 
of evidence, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81 
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), or the waiver of Miranda 
rights, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 
In conformity with the rationale 
announced by the Supreme Court, we overrule 
our previous decisions requiring the 
government at a suppression hearing to prove 
voluntariness [of consent to search] by clear 
and convincing evidence. "[T]he controlling 
burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden than proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence." United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 
94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 
(1974). 
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United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d at 76. In Lego v. Twomev, the 
Supreme Court explained its rationale for the preponderance 
standard: 
Since the purpose that a voluntariness 
hearing is designed to serve has nothing 
whatever to do with improving the reliability 
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge 
that judging the admissibility of a 
confession by a preponderance of the evidence 
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1970). Our decision in Winship was not 
concerned with the standards for determining 
the admissibility of evidence or with the 
prosecution's burden of proof at a 
suppression hearing when evidence is 
challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Winship went no further than to confirm the 
fundamental right that protects "the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." JEd. at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1072. . . 
. A guilty verdict is not rendered less 
reliable or less consonant with Winship 
simply because the admissibility of a 
confession is determined by a less stringent 
standard. . . . 
404 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also rejected the argument that 
the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional 
grounds should be determined under a stricter standard of proof 
in order to protect the values that exclusionary rules are 
designed to protect: 
The argument is straightforward and has 
appeal. But we are unconvinced that merely 
emphasizing the importance of the values 
served by exclusionary rules is itself 
sufficient demonstration that the 
Constitution also requires admissibility to 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment has been excluded from federal 
criminal trials for years. The same is true 
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of coerced confessions offered in federal or 
state trials. But, from our experience over 
this period of time no substantial evidence 
has accumulated that federal rights have 
suffered from determining admissibility by a 
preponderance of the evidence. . . . Without 
good cause, we are unwilling to expand 
currently applicable exclusionary rules by 
erecting additional barriers to placing 
truthful and probative evidence before state 
juries . . . . Sound reason for moving 
further in this direction has not been 
offered here nor do we discern any at the 
present time. This is particularly true 
since the exclusionary rules are very much 
aimed at deterring lawless conduct by the 
police and prosecution and it is very 
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's 
burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
suppression hearings would be sufficiently 
productive in this respect to outweigh the 
public interest in placing probative evidence 
before juries for the purpose of arriving at 
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence. 
404 U.S. at 488-89 (citations and footnote omitted). Although 
the Court said that "the States are free pursuant to their own 
law, to adopt a higher standard[,] [in that] [tjhey may indeed 
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find 
at stake," id., at 489, the reasoning of Lego v. Twomev is sound 
and should provide the basis for this Court clearly specifying 
that the state need only prove voluntary consent to search by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 
119, 806 P.2d 92, 104 (1991) (in holding that, under Oregon 
Constitution, state must prove voluntary consent to search by 
only a preponderance of the evidence, court adopts reasoning of 
Lego v. Twomev). Cf. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 
1989) ("State bears burden of proving by at least a preponderance 
of the evidence that a defendant's confession is voluntary"). 
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In short, if this case is remanded, the Court should 
direct the trial court that the state need only prove voluntary 
consent by a preponderance of the evidence. 
B. Exploitation 
The exploitation prong of the Arrovo test is not so 
easily understood or applied. Without explaining precisely how 
the exploitation analysis is to proceed, the Utah Supreme Court 
said only that the primary inquiry is whether the consent was 
sufficiently "attenuated" from the prior illegality such that the 
consent was not "tainted" by that illegality. 796 P.2d at 690-
91. The court noted the Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), 
factors which should be considered, jld.. at 690-91 n.4, but did 
not make clear whether the primary focus of the exploitation 
analysis is the possible effect of the initial police misconduct 
on the voluntariness of the consent or rather the police 
misconduct itself. Arrovo cites numerous cases on the issue of 
exploitation, JLd. at 690-91, but does not express a preference 
for one of the two approaches those cases appear to adopt. Under 
one approach, voluntariness of the consent is the primary 
consideration, and if there is voluntary consent (i.e., the 
consent has not been rendered involuntary by the prior police 
illegality), the evidence seized pursuant to the consent is 
generally admissible. Under the other approach, the police 
misconduct itself is the primary consideration. A consent to 
search that is obtained close in time and circumstance to the 
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police illegality, although entirely voluntary, is "tainted," and 
the evidence seized pursuant to the consent is inadmissible. 
For example, some of the cases cited in Arroyo discuss 
the exploitation question primarily in terms of the potential 
effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of the 
consent. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550 
(11th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e hold that the consent was the product of 
the illegal detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable 
stop was not sufficiently attenuated. . . . [T]here were 
insufficient intervening circumstances that might have reduced 
the coercive nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to 
make a voluntary decision about the consent search."); United 
States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no 
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the 
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to 
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v. 
Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 298 (La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances 
presented here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be 
a product of her free will."). 
On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply 
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether 
the voluntariness of the consent had been undermined by the 
police misconduct. These cases seem to focus solely on the 
police misconduct and whether it "taints" the consent such that 
the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the 
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poisonous tree" doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407f 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom, 
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980). 
The latter approach was followed by two panels of this 
Court in Sims and Park, which, as already noted, involved consent 
searches after illegal roadblock stops. In Sims, the panel began 
its analysis by acknowledging that the defendant did not 
challenge the voluntariness of his consent to the search, but 
that he claimed "there was insufficient attenuation between his 
detention and the consent . . . to purge the taint of the 
illegality of the detention." 808 P.2d at 150. It applied the 
Brown v. Illinois factors which Arroyo had identified as 
pertinent to the evaluation of the "non-exploitation or 
attenuation element": "the temporal proximity of the primary 
illegality and the granting of the consent, the presence or 
absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and 
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct." Ibid. Concluding that 
"the record demonstrates [the defendant's] consent to search his 
vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of the illegal roadblock," 
id. at 152, the panel relied most heavily on two factors: (1) 
"the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, and 
not even under our clear error standard of review could the trial 
court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent 
to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) "the 
record reveal[ed] [no] possibility of intervening circumstances 
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between the illegal stop and [the defendant's] grant of consent 
to the search," id. at 151.6 An identical approach was followed 
by the Park panel in reversing the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's motion to suppress. 810 P.2d at 458-59. This 
mechanical application of the exploitation prong, which 
automatically invalidates a search and/or seizure if the 
voluntary consent is closely connected in time and by 
circumstance to the prior illegality (a scenario which is 
frequently present in these kinds of cases), amounts to the "but 
for" rule of exclusion that was rejected in Wong Sun v. United 
6
 Although the Sims panel also considered the "purpose and 
flagrancy" factor, 808 P.2d at 151-52, it is not clear whether it 
concluded that the officers' misconduct was purposeful or 
flagrant. However, the panel seemed to suggest that the 
officers' conduct was flagrant because (1) "[t]he troopers each 
had years of law enforcement experience, and [could] properly be 
charged with awareness that their action was not authorized by 
law," and (2) "[u]sing ten to twelve law officers to staff the 
roadblock may have also left distant parts of the largely rural 
jurisdiction with delayed police assistance in the event of 
need." 808 P.2d at 151. First, at the time of the roadblock 
there was no decision from either of Utah's appellate courts or 
the federal courts that would have made it clear to the officers 
that their actions were unconstitutional. And, to require of the 
officers the clairvoyance necessary to anticipate Michigan Dept. 
of State Police v. Sitz and the unique state constitutional 
holding of Sims is unreasonable. Second, the panel's criticism 
of the use of law enforcement resources, beyond being speculative 
and outside of any particular expertise of the judiciary, does 
not form a basis for concluding that the officers were guilty of 
a flagrant or purposeful constitutional violation. 
Furthermore, Sims's suggestion that the absence of 
purposeful or flagrant police misconduct can serve to "correct 
the constitutional violation," 808 P.2d at 152, is wrong. All 
that Arroyo recognizes is that voluntary consent to search, which 
is not obtained by exploitation of an initial illegality, can be 
the basis for the admission of evidence seized pursuant to such 
consent; it does not stand for the proposition that such consent 
"corrects" the prior constitutional violation. 
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States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). See United States v. 
Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1981) ("lack of significant 
intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the 
evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation"). As 
stated in Arroyo, "'all evidence is [not] 'fruit of the poisonous 
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the 
illegal actions of the police.'" 796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Wong 
Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88) (citation omitted). 
A fundamental problem with Sims and Park is that they 
fail to acknowledge that the Arroyo court chose to remand to the 
trial court for a determination of the exploitation issue under 
nearly identical facts (i.e., an illegal vehicle stop which was 
followed shortly thereafter by the defendant's consent to a 
search of the vehicle), 796 P.2d at 692. Had the supreme court 
considered the close temporal proximity between the illegal stop 
and the consent, coupled with the absence of any intervening 
circumstances, to be dispositive of the exploitation question, as 
Sims and Park concluded, it would not have remanded for a 
determination of that question by the trial court. In ordering a 
remand, Arroyo implicitly rejected the mechanical approach to the 
exploitation analysis employed in Sims and Park. 
The contrary approach to the exploitation inquiry, 
which focuses primarily on the possible effect of the police 
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent, appears to be 
most consistent with Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), 
identified in Arroyo as an example of the application of the 
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exploitation prong in a consent search case. 796 P.2d at 690. 
In Rover, the police stopped the defendant at an airport based on 
a drug courier profile and ultimately obtained his consent to a 
search of his luggage, in which narcotics were found.7 Royer 
moved to suppress the contraband seized from his luggage. The 
trial court denied the motion, ruling that Royer's consent to the 
search was "freely and voluntarily" given. 460 U.S. at 495. The 
intermediate appellate court of Florida reversed, holding that 
Royer's detention was unlawful and that the unlawful detention 
tainted Royer's consent to search. Ibid. That decision was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion. 460 U.S. 
at 493-508. Although, as noted in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690, the 
plurality never directly questioned the trial court's finding 
that Royer's consent was "freely and voluntarily" given, it 
7
 The Court recounted Royer's consent as follows: 
[After the detectives had removed Royer to a 
small room and retrieved his luggage from the 
airline], Royer was asked if he would consent 
to a search of the suitcases. Without orally 
responding to this request, Royer produced a 
key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which 
one detective then opened without seeking 
further assent from Royer. Marihuana was 
found in that suitcase. According to 
Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did 
not know the combination to the lock on the 
second suitcase. When asked if he objected 
to the detective opening the second suitcase, 
Royer said "[n]o, go ahead," and did not 
object when the detective explained that the 
suitcase might have to be broken open. The 
suitcase was pried open by the officers and 
more marihuana was found. . . . 
460 U.S. at 494-95. 
-20-
nevertheless appears to have been primarily concerned with the 
coercive circumstances under which the consent was obtained and 
the effect those circumstances had on the voluntariness of the 
consent. This is evident from Justice Powell's concurrence, in 
which he wrote: "I agree with the plurality that . . • [the 
defendant's] surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot 
be viewed as consensual." 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
In Arroyo, the Utah Supreme Court rejected an 
exploitation analysis that focuses solely on voluntariness, 
declining to adopt the reasoning of United States v. Carson, 793 
F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986). There, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held: 
[I]n a case in which evidence is obtained 
pursuant to consent granted subsequent to 
illegal police actions, the "exploitation" 
issue under Wong Sun is resolved simply by 
determining whether or not defendant's grant 
of consent was voluntary under the 
circumstances. . . • When defendant's grant 
of consent is voluntary, then there is no 
exploitation; . . . the findings of voluntary 
consent and "exploitation" are mutually 
exclusive. 
793 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis in original). However, the court's 
rejection of Carson must be considered in connection with its 
reliance on Rover. In this light, Arroyo is most reasonably read 
as adopting an exploitation analysis that focuses primarily, but 
not solely, on the voluntariness of the consent to search. Under 
such an approach, the Brown v. Illinois factors are more easily 
and logically applied. 
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In Brown, the United States Supreme Court had before it 
the narrow question of whether "the Illinois courts were in error 
in assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong 
Sun always purge the taint of an illegal arrest." 422 U.S. at 
605. Brown had been arrested without probable cause and without 
a warrant; and, while in custody and after being given Miranda 
warnings, he made two inculpatory statements concerning a murder. 
Id. at 591, 594-95. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that, 
although Brown's arrest was illegal, the giving of Miranda 
warnings "'served to break the causal connection between the 
illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and that 
defendant's act in making the statements was 'sufficiently an act 
of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful 
invasion.' (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, at 486.)'" 
Id. at 597 (quoting People v. Brown, 56 111.2d 312, 307 N.E.2d 
356, 358 (111. 1974)). At bottom, the state court held that "the 
Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain so 
that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the continuing 
effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so long as, 
in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not coerced in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Ibid. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the implication of 
its holding in Wong Sun to the facts of Brown's case. Ibid. 
The Court began by reviewing its holding in Wong Sun, 
where the issue was "whether statements and other evidence 
obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded." 
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Id. at 597. The statements were obtained from two defendants, 
Toy and Wong Sun. Toy's statement was obtained immediately after 
he was pursued and arrested by six agents. It apparently was a 
spontaneous response to a question asked him in the frenzy of 
that event, and the agents apparently made no attempt to advise 
him of his right to remain silent. Wong Sun's statement, on the 
other hand, was not given until after he was arraigned and 
released on his own recognizance. He voluntarily returned to the 
station a few days after his arrest for questioning, and his 
statement came after he had been advised of his right to remain 
silent and to have counsel present. .Id., at 607-08 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part). Under these facts, the Wong Sun Court ruled 
that Toy's statement should not have been admitted as evidence 
against him, holding that "the statement did not result from 'an 
intervening independent act of a free will,' and that it was not 
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of 
the unlawful invasion.'" Id., at 598 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 
at 486). However, with respect to Wong Sun's confession, the 
Court ruled that it was admissible because "the connection 
between his unlawful arrest and the statement 'had become so 
attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Ibid, (quoting Wong Sunf 
371 U.S. at 491) (citation omitted). 
The Brown Court then made clear that "[t]he 
exclusionary rule . • . was applied in Wong Sun primarily to 
protect Fourth Amendment rights. Protection of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the Court's 
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paramount concern there," Jd. at 599 (emphasis in original). In 
short, the Court's foremost concern was to apply the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule where it would serve its primary 
purpose of deterring illegal conduct by the police — and thus 
the different rulings regarding Toy's statement and Wong Sun's 
statement. As Justice Powell admonished in his concurring 
opinion, "the Wong Sun inquiry always should be conducted with 
the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
sharply in focus." .Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part) 
(citation omitted). 
It was against this backdrop that the Brown Court 
rejected the per se rule of admission adopted by the Illinois 
courts and also declined to adopt an alternative per se or "but 
for" rule of exclusion. Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he 
question whether a confession is the product of a free will under 
Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case[,] [and] no 
single fact is dispositive." .Id. at 603. It made clear that the 
presence of Miranda warnings does not control the determination 
of whether a confession that has followed a fourth amendment 
violation is admissible. While that factor is important in 
determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of 
the fourth amendment violation, other relevant factors are to be 
considered, including: "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest 
and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, 
and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct." Jd.. at 603-04 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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11: :ii s wi th 1:1 :ii s understanding of Wong Sun and Brown 
th at Arroyo must t e i: ead hs j: • i:e 71ous J y dIscus sed, Arr oyo 
specifically relied on Rover as an example of the application of 
the expJ oi tation analysis to a case where evidence was sei zed 
pu r s u a 111 t o a c on s en t t o sear c 1 1 wh i c h f o 1 1 owe d a 1 1 i n i. t i a 1 f o u r t h 
amendment violation. The Rover plurality's primary concern 
appears t- :: ha • re been 1:1 le vc ] i 11 ita ri ness of the consent to search. 
Thus, Ar r o y o ' s reference to the Brown factors, coupled witl 1 i ts 
reliance on Rover and :i ts rejection of Carson, is most reasonably 
i 1 iterpreted as a .1 1 adop ti c 1 1 c f a .1 1 sxploi ta !::i c •! 1 ana ] ysi s wh i :::l 1 (1 ) 
focuses p 2: i m a r i 1 y , b u t 11 o t s o 1 e 1 y, o n I: h e v o 1 u n t a r i n e s s o f 11 1 e 
consent, (2) app] i es the Brown factors to determine whether the 
11: i n e s s : • f 1:1 1 = :: : 1 1 s e 1 1 !:  v a s i 1: 1 f a • : t: a f f e c 1: e d 1: ;; t: 1 1 e j: 1: i o ;J : 
police illegal! ty, ai id (3) considers whether tl le police 
mi sconduct wa « F n f f i r j ent ly flagrant or pi irposef 11] that: the 
1 1  rlt- in 1 '-In HI I 11 U- i xn J1 id HI I e v e i 1 t l ion 1 :jl 1 1:1 ie c o i i s e i 1 t: t: ::  sear ::1 1 ; a s 
e n t i r e l y v o l u n t a r y . The i n 31 1 :i 1: y would p r o c e e d a s f o l l o w s : (111 ) 
Was t h e c o n s e n t :ii n f a c t rendered i n v o l u n t a ry by the temporal 
pioxiiiiii t y be tween tl ie f DUI: tl 1 amendment vie l a t i on ai id tl ie c ::>j is en t , 
the absence of any intervening circumstances, or flagrant police 
misconduct? 8 { 2 ) Even :i f i t is determined that the consent was 
voluntary after consideration :: f the possi t le effect of a J 1  three 
8
 Consideration, of voluntariness under the exploitatioi 1 
prong of the Arroyo test may overlap to some degree with the 
voluntariness inquiry which has already occurred under the first 
prong of that test. However, under the exploitation prong, 
particular attention is paid to the police illegality and its 
possible effect on voluntariness. 
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Brown factors on voluntariness, was the police misconduct 
purposeful or flagrant such that the evidence should be excluded 
in order to deter that level of police misconduct? With respect 
to this second question, if there is a purposeful or flagrant 
violation of the fourth amendment, then the first two Brown 
factors (temporal proximity and intervening circumstances) are 
considered to determine if there is sufficient "attenuation" to 
remove the "taint" from the flagrant violation which would 
naturally flow under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 
In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Powell illustrated 
this process in the confession context: 
I would require the clearest indication of 
attenuation in cases in which official 
conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth 
Amendment rights.... In such cases the 
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is 
most likely to be effective, and the 
corresponding mandate to preserve judicial 
integrity most clearly demands that the 
fruits of the official misconduct be denied. 
I thus would require some demonstrably 
effective break in the chain of events 
leading from the illegal arrest to the 
statement, such as actual consultation with 
counsel or the accused's presentation before 
a magistrate for a determination of probable 
cause, before the taint can be deemed 
removed. 
422 U.S. at 610-11 (citations omitted). A similar analysis would 
be made in the consent to search case, and the first two Brown 
factors would determine whether the consent was sufficiently 
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a 1:tenuatedli j i i terms o£ 1:i n:te and circumstance to D e iree oi u i« 
taint of the flagrant police misconduct,9 
This approach recognizes both that "i n some circumstances 
strict adherence to the Fou rtl :i Amendment excj usionary rule ": 
imposes greater cost oi i legitimate demands of law enforcement 
than can be justified by the rule's deterrent purposes," and that 
:i i i :ases c f f ] a ::jra i if j o] i ce in :i s :: :  a I :ii ILC: it: " t l ic deterrei it 1 a ] i le of 
the exclusioi tary rule is most 1 ikely to be effective, "" Brown, . 
422 U.S. at 608-09 , 6 ] 1 (Powel] , ] concurring in part). 
Thus as sum :i i ig a rer ia.1 id c f tl :i i s :::ase f : r • :: • : i isil der ati on 
~f the exploitation prong of the Arroyo test, this Cour t should 
1: re-:" the tri al court to employ the foregoing analysis, rather 
previously discussed, is not consistent wi th either Rover or the 
remand ordered in Arroyo. 
9
 Had the officers' conduct in Sims actually been =~rant, 
which it was not, the panel would have been correct in ., ^Ing 
the evidence on,, the basis that there was no significant 1 of 
time or intervening circumstances between the consent - h 
and the illegality. But in the absence of flagrant COJ. . . he 




Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
remand this case to the trial court for a determination of 
whether defendant's consent to search was valid under Arroyo. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jtf day of November, 
1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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On September ?0 1988, Minn Ilfnh Highway Patrol in 
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During the roadblock, all cars were stopped. Pursuant 
to the roadblock, defendants were stopped. During the stop, the 
officer present observed defendant Small shove a plastic bag 
between the front seats of the car. The officer checked both 
defendants1 identification and determined that the car was not 
registered to either defendant. While awaiting confirmation from 
dispatch regarding registration, the officer asked defendants 
whether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car. 
The response was in the negative. The officer then requested 
permission to search the vehicle. Consent was given. 
As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer 
noticed a gun under the front seat. Subsequent search of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle revealed a substantial 
quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, money, and loaded 
firearms. In the course of the search of the passenger 
compartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything 
about the firearms or the drugs. Defendants responded in the 
negative. They were subsequently arrested and were apprised of 
their rights before any further attempt at questioning. 
As the officer searched the passenger compartment of 
the vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marijuana. He 
subsequently, opened the trunk and found more drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was 
properly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). The checkpoint was located in 
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The defendant^ detained ^ facts; came to 
light during the check that created a reasonable suspicion that 
the occupants were engaged in some criminal activity (Carner). 
The uncontroverted testimony is that the defendants were properly 
advised of their rights before further attempts at questioning. 
All of the above factors: notice of the stop, its 
location, legitimate purpose of the stop, training of the 
officers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was 
an articulateble and reasonable suspicion, establish a minimum 
of public inconvenience. 
Defendants gave permission to search the vehicle. 
Consent was never withdrawn. As such, the subsequent search of 
the trunk was reasonable and proper. Even if the consent was 
somehow defective, (and there is no evidence that this is the 
case) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the 
passenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had 
probable cause to search the trunk space. See State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the 
vehicle stop, search, and subsequent arrest were properly 
administered. The Court therefore denies defendants1 motion to 
suppress. 
n 
DATED at Provo, Utah this ^ f day of August, 1989. 
GEORGE ¥. BALLIF, JUDGE / 
cc: Dexter Anderson * 
Milton Harmon 
Sumner Hatch 
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